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August 30, 1996
Now: \nucmem\gist.1
October 9-10, 1996

[Dream: fundraising from rich individuals, \$20,000, to finance a production, a play or movie, perhaps to focus on me and to be narrated by me, on my experience with the nuclear planning. Problem is, we can't sign a lease on a building (for production?) because we don't know if it will be successful enough.

I play a role in the performance; a woman; with a wig? and low, woman's voice. My first acting.

Get money from Greene; from R----_---- in Boston?; Bert?

Use CDI video, to fund-raise (inc. Sperrys?);

To publish on the Web?

For a more ambitious film, with film clips illustrating nuclear age? (CDI help?)

Show agents, publishers?

Waking thoughts:

1. Current relevance of nuclear history: the experience of the US and SU (and the other NWS, nuclear weapon states) is likely to be reproduced, soon.

India and Pakistan may be about to launch a nuclear arms race much like that of the US and SU. India may test soon, followed by Pakistan, with Pakistan building missiles (with the help of China), and both sides deploying. This race may have the worst aspects of its predecessor, with both sides deploying vulnerable weapons with a vulnerable C3 system, and with an ongoing border war.

The same could be true for India and China.

The example may apply also to Israel and its neighbors, including Egypt and Iran. Already, as from the beginning of its program, Israel is imitating the US in blindness to the preeminent danger of a nuclear arms race and proliferation threatening its own survival, and blindness to the reality that these cannot be prevented in the context of its own nuclear ambitions, program and status.

With the non-proliferation framework breaking down entirely, Germany and Japan could go nuclear, spurring widespread proliferation. (Europe; Korea; Taiwan; Indonesia;...) (The more

advanced states could afford more stable systems in terms of basing--submarines--and command and control. Yet...)

Each of these countries is likely to reproduce major aspects of the US-SU folly--perhaps all of it, in detail, in all its dangers, waste and horror--without knowing it, since the true, secret US-SU plans, actions and aims remain hidden and unknown, even in the US and Russia.

Official secrecy still covers most of the documents. Not one participant in any NWS with real knowledge of nuclear war plans and posture has written a revelatory memoir. Nor have there been relevant hearings. Journalistic accounts have had little authority and gotten little attention.

2. My own account has the potential for a wider audience because it is part of a lifestory that leads up to the notorious history of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate (whose actual relation to the ending of the Vietnam War is also unknown).

Even without many documents (though that is a regrettable limitation) it can earn authority and persuasiveness by its verisimilitude, convincing personal perspective, in presenting my sequential introduction to the secret world of nuclear planning and decision-making. The dangers revealed to me are dramatized by the actions to which I was led to reduce and avert them.

3. The gist:

From the late '50's on (with a nuclear race with the Soviets underway), US possession of nuclear weapons was rationalised and legitimated almost entirely in terms of one aim and one eventuality of use (whose probability was to be minimized by a deterrent readiness to retaliate; thus the weapons were deployed "in order never to be launched")

Call that aim, deterrence of surprise nuclear attack, A; and the one eventuality of combat use, occurrence of SU surprise attack, 1.

My mentor at RAND, Albert Wohlstetter (AJW), found that the existing US strategic nuclear force was actually very ill-suited to survive in the one eventuality (he supposed) it was meant to be used. Those it was ill-designed to serve its (supposed) single function of deterrence.

To judge its actual ability to deter surprise attack, he proposed that only those remnants that would foreseeably and reliably survive a well-designed enemy attack were relevant (to the enemy's pre-attack calculations underlying its decision to attack: assuming that this decision would be sensitive to such calculations). This might be a very small fraction of the existing

pre-attack US force.

I quickly learned at RAND (in the summer of 1958) that there was another eventuality that could lead to launch of the US force: call it 2, the apparent imminence of Soviet attack, signalled either by tactical (electronic, infrared) warning or by "strategic warning."

Apparently (as I first was led to believe) this reflected an awareness, on both sides, of this very vulnerability. Unless US forces were launched (perhaps on positive control, not yet committing them to attack targets) on warning, before enemy vehicles arrived, there could be no retaliation at all, and this prospect would undermine and perhaps negate deterrence.

But 2 is not a simple, single state of the world. An appearance of imminent attack, in varying degrees of certainty or subjective probability, could arise in a variety of circumstances, many of which would be "false alarms" not reflecting any immediate Soviet intentions or actions to initiate attack. Thus, in judging the likelihood that US weapons might actually be launched, the possible eventualities are expanded to 3, 4...n, unless "2" is interpreted to be a class of situations sharing signs of imminent Soviet attack on US forces.

AJW argued persuasively that even given this readiness to launch on warning, a well-designed attack might reduce US retaliatory capability to a very small remnant, because the warning would be ambiguous and the US decision to launch therefore delayed, perhaps fatally.

(The concepts and propositions here were especially persuasive and interesting to me in 1958 and 1959 because of my particular work in decision theory on ambiguity and responses to it).

In reality, the readiness to launch on warning mainly reflected another US objective altogether for the use of its nuclear weapons: to reduce damage to the US in the event that strategic nuclear war actually occurred (or, as it was usually put, misleadingly as we shall see, "in case deterrence failed"), by destroying Soviet nuclear forces (before they were launched).

This aim--call it B--called for a different set of targets and for different priorities and urgencies in terms of timing and US capabilities. Such considerations implied quite different ways of evaluating the adequacy of the US force or improving it. Aim B, "damage reduction," put a great premium on hitting Soviet forces and command centers and communications before those forces were launched at all, or at least while as many of them were on the ground as possible, thus on arriving at their targets early in or if possible prior to actual Soviet launch.

To this end, survivability of US forces under Soviet attack might not be necessary, and might not even contribute. Certain ways of making US forces more survivable would even lessen their ability to limit damage to the US, by slowing their response to warning.

AJW and his colleagues mostly assumed that aim B was generally subordinate to aim A, to be considered and pursued only to the extent possible after the fullest possible efforts to achieve A. But this did not reflect Air Force priorities at all and amounted to a misunderstanding of the considerations and objectives that led to the actual design and operation of the force.

This was true especially because there were actually several other objectives, all highly compatible with pursuit of aim B (much less so with expensive pursuit of A, which was actually seen as having much lower relevance and priority), whose significance was either unknown to AJW and his RAND colleagues and greatly underrated by them. (Again, this amounted to a misunderstanding by them of the purposes, functions and relevant characteristics of the US force as seen by the Air Force and their superiors. To the extent that RAND perceived the Air Force and Administration priorities but saw them as misguided, this reflected RAND ignorance of the strategic context, in particular size and characteristics of Soviet forces, as it was secretly seen, fairly realistically, by the officials. The officials fostered this ignorance, in part because they shared a self-servingly mistaken view of Soviet long-term intentions).

Aim C: to deter Soviet attack on West Europe, by threat of a US first strike against the Soviet Union (in the event of which, aim B would be paramount).

Aim D: to improve the credibility of US threats of first-use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces blockading Berlin, or taking limited actions elsewhere in Europe or on its periphery (such as Iran or Turkey), by threatening to escalate up to a US first strike against the Soviet Union if the SU should respond with nuclear weapons to US first-use.

Aim E: likewise, to improve the credibility of US threats of first-use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Third World, especially against allies or clients of the Soviet Union, by threatening a first-strike against the SU if the Soviets should use tactical nuclear weapons in support of such US adversaries in response to US first-use (or otherwise).

The US was relying on first-use threats of tactical weapons to defend Berlin, its allies in Europe and elsewhere (e.g., South Korea), and to deter Soviet moves "against US interests" elsewhere (e.g., against Iran or other countries in the Middle East, to defend its own allies or clients such as Cuba or India).

These threats could be hardly be credible enough to be effective if the US had no basis for deterring, or believing that it might deter, Soviet nuclear response in kind, which would be at the least totally destructive of the ally or interests the US was trying to protect.

The basis for believing (to some degree) that the Soviets might not respond at all with their own tactical nuclear weapons to US tactical nuclear attack on their own forces or their allies' was that the Soviet would perceive that the US was ready in such circumstances to launch a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union. And the credibility of the latter counter-threat depended on US ability, in this case, to achieve aim B, reducing or averting damage to the US from Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

Finally, perhaps above all, there was aim F, to increase the Air Force budget, the size of the strategic forces, and the continued development of advanced aerospace technology. (This aim, in all its aspects, was shared not only by the Air Force but by the corporations and communities and unions depending on Air Force contracts, on the desires for profits and jobs, and by the politicians in Congress and the Administration depending on votes and campaign contributions reflecting their support of the industry).

This last objective was, on the whole, much better served by focus on aim B--which promoted larger force size and relied on advanced and continually developing technology--than on aim A. Aim A, survivability, led to proposals by RAND for pouring concrete--for revetments for bombers, silos for missiles--rather than for building more numerous airplanes that would fly higher and faster with ever-increasingly advanced electronics (the B-70, later the B-1 and B-2). Such RAND proposals competed within Air Force budgets with what the Air Force really wanted. And they could even encourage US budget money to go outside the Air Force altogether, toward Polaris submarines.

For the same reason, and other diplomatic and strategic reasons, there was an emphasis on aims C, D and E, which together (with F) really determined the scale and shape of the US strategic nuclear forces. To understand this is to comprehend many aspects of the force "posture" that otherwise (from the perspective of aim A alone, or as seen by RAND in the late-Fifties) seemed inexplicable, incompetent, wasteful, and dangerous.

That is, it is to see them as coherent, purposive, non-random. It is not to say they were not dangerous (nor that there was not, even after these other objectives and their impact are recognized, much waste, incompetence, and random, uncontrolled, accidental features enlarging the dangers).

On the contrary, the effect of pursuing these multiple aims

was greatly to expand the set of eventualities in which the US threatened, was ready, and might actually be led to launch nuclear weapons, in most cases before any adversary had decided to do so. And in nearly all of these cases (perhaps, really, all of them) such launch would be grotesquely harmful to the interests of the US and its allies and to all humanity.

Moreover, the US and Soviet Union had been led, in secret (and in response to such secret, largely denied or obscured aims) to construct vast, complex systems of nuclear destruction that were subject to accidents, unauthorised actions, and above all to false alarms, unprecedented dangers which added to the dangers (above) of the deliberate carrying out of threats and plans by highest authorities acting on the basis of realistic information.

(The latter dangers are so secret and unknown or underrated by most people, not only in the public but by most "experts" and scholars, that the former risk of accidents and false alarms are seen as the only dangers. Great as these risks are, they are not the only ones, or in my opinion, even the main ones. That situation is likely to be reproduced in newly proliferating Third World regions, and it is likely to misperceived there as well).

Thus, even if eventuality 2 above is seen as a large class of possible states of the world, it must be joined by 3, 4, ..., n (n very large) of situations, all with positive probability, that might evoke US first-use or first-strike, on the basis of existing US preparations, readiness, plans and threats, and the conceptions of officials and advisors. The overall probability has always been very much greater than nearly any commentator has realized, or even most officials within the government.

And most proposals for reducing the dangers that were perceived have failed to address the hidden motives that have sustained them and have been essentially disregarded by officials influenced by those motives. Unaware of the motives and the interest groups behind them, critics and adversaries of the nuclear buildup and posture have generally failed to expose, argue against, or mobilise political opposition to them.

The same motives, groups, and conceptions can be seen in India, Pakistan and other prospective proliferators, operating under the same secrecy and public ignorance, with the likelihood of reproducing the same dangerous follies on a regional scale. The likely result will be regional nuclear wars and terrorist actions each of which will be irreparably destructive beyond any prior precedent, even if they do not immediately threaten human survival (as a possible US-Russian conflict continues to do, even though with much lower probability in the short run).

4. My story is one of discovering, in turn, aims A through F, and the expanding realm of contingencies that could evoke nuclear

, andwar, in my work from 1958 to 1964 and beyond. My pursuit of aim A led me almost immediately into some of the most closely-guarded secrets of all, in nuclear war planning, alert posture, and command and control arrangements, exposing dangers known to very few at most and in some cases to no one else.

Many now see the danger of more Hiroshimas as sizeable and growing, because of the potential imminent spread of the possession of nuclear materials into new hands. There are signs that the new possessors will imitate the policies of the superpowers, on a smaller scale. This is seen as dangerous, because the new possessors are seen as less responsible and cautious, more prone to use the weapons, than their predecessors. This may be true.

At the same time the analogy to the history of the superpower arms race may be reassuring, since that race did not lead, over fifty years, to new nuclear explosions. In fact, it is generally believed (wrongly) that leaders of the superpowers never came close to using their weapons, that there was no serious consideration of using them, even in crises. Thus, even leaders who are marginally less cautious may still show little inclination to use the weapons other than as a source of prestige and empty bluff.

I think this source of assurance is dangerously unreliable. My own knowledge of the secret history of decision-making during the Cold War leads me to have a greater sense of concern and urgency about the dangers of proliferation than those officials who pay lip-service to the problem but who fail to act correspondingly. Their actual complacency, leading to American policies with great inertia, reflects, I believe, an ignorance shared with the public of the actual risks of Cold War policies pursued by a succession of American Presidents and Soviet leaders, risks that are likely to be reproduced by Third World and other new nuclear states.

I have concluded that I can best convey the sense of concern, danger and urgency I feel about the imminent prospects of proliferation by a political memoir...

There has been no such memoir by anyone as involved as I was in nuclear war planning or in the study of nuclear crises...

lack of documents...and without documents, particular resistance to believing that American officials could have created such dangers as they did...

My own memoir will have a wide audience because it led to the story of PP, VN, WG...dramatic and still untold. (Nixon's strategy in VN is still secret and publicly misunderstood, as is its link to Watergate and the connection between WG and the ending of the war.)

Because of the commercial prospects of this story, a large advance could be expected. That would be a way of financing the effort to tell the whole story. However, the disadvantage of going for an early advance before the nuclear part of the story has actually been written is that this could well lead to pressure by a publisher to scant or omit this part of the story. Since the

publisher will be unfamiliar with it, it would be hard to foresee its interest for the public (which is generally resistant to learning about the nuclear arms race).

However, if grants could finance my project of getting my nuclear experiences into readable (draft) form, there is a good prospect that a commercial publisher who then had the chance to read them would be anxious to see them included, or at any rate would accept and promote a manuscript that did include them. (For a sense of the drama and relevance of these revelations, see the CDI video). And in any case, once these were on the record they could be circulated and published in a number of ways: a separate book, pamphlets, professional articles, even the Internet. This would be in addition to whatever is included in the overall memoir; and that is likely to be more, the more of this material that is written before a publisher enters the picture and begins to influence the contents and length. (To include this perspective will certainly increase the length significantly. I have come to believe that this would be worthwhile, despite disadvantages. But if in the end this part has to be shortened, I would strongly prefer that the "nuclear memoir" be ready for distribution in some other form than that the writing of it should be postponed until the other memoir dealing with Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers and Watergate has been completed.

At some points I have believed that it would be too unwieldy to try to tell my whole life, including both my involvement with nuclear planning and crises and with Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers, in one account. I've changed my mind on this, for various reasons. And the attempt to tell it as one story has the advantage, for the circulation of the first, that it will get a very much larger audience than it would if presented by itself.

But for that very reason, a publisher who doesn't know what I have to tell about these nuclear matters is likely to be skeptical about and resistant to supporting an effort to tell them together. If, to support my writing, I have to get an early advance from a commercial publisher, I expect to come under pressure from that publisher to shorten and minimize, even omit, my experience with nuclear dangers. I would prefer to have that written at length before my manuscript was seen by a publisher. I anticipate that this will greatly lower the resistance, or eliminate it, to including this material even though the effect is to lengthen the book significantly.

Therefore I am seeking grant aid for six months to a year to finance the first stages of writing my memoir, even though the later stages have good prospects of being supported by a publisher's advance. With such aid, I would produce a unique body of writing on my direct knowledge of the nuclear era which would be available for circulation fully in various forms at greater length than could be included in the Pentagon Papers memoir, at whatever

length it proves possible to incorporate it in the latter (and the more the better, from my point of view).

I have concluded that the best way I can persuade others to share my own sense of priorities and urgency regarding research--and beyond that, regarding policy and political action--is by a kind of political memoir that will bring together the experiences and pieces of information that brought me to these questions and hypotheses and that gradually shaped my own awareness.

[Take out "general." All this applies, now, to regional limited and preemptive nuclear war. Not, particularly, to terrorism: there, abolition is the appropriate framework. But terrorism isn't the only prospect. Reciprocal arms races and limited wars on the Cold War model are also newly relevant. India-Pakistan. Israel-Middle East...industrialized states... China/Far East...(Japan)...

Secret history of the Cold War nuclear arms race and crises is, after all, still highly relevant to the long run. A basis for a realistically high sense of the coming dangers of proliferation. A basis for a more urgent anti-proliferation and abolition policy. Thus, a basis for more urgent efforts to change the present policies of the nuclear weapons states, as a precursor to an effective abolition policy.]

To a striking degree, my research agenda, like my political concerns, remains what it became a quarter-century ago, while I was still in the government. For even longer than that, my main preoccupation has been both to understand and to avert the prospect of general nuclear war.

But it was my participation in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and my official study in 1964, with high-level access to "sensitive" secret information, of decision-making in nuclear crises, that first shaped my present sense of the most likely way that general nuclear war might come about: thus, my sense of the specific phenomena that most need to be understood and prevented.

My own high-level participation in the process of escalating the Vietnam war in 1964-65, my experience in the field in Vietnam in the next two years, followed by my reading of the Pentagon Papers study, all strengthened this sense

Nuc war would come either from preemption, or from a sequence of events that led to the making of nuclear threats, which might fail to lead to compliance and might then be carried out and perhaps reciprocated.

But would the threats ever be carried out? Establishment

experts see some danger that this might happen with new leaders, especially in the Third World, because they see some chance that such leaders would be more prone to pull triggers than (they think) US and Russian leaders ever were. But I think they underestimate the danger of this because they underestimate the actual dangers posed by those US and Russian leaders which some of them served. I see significant danger in proliferation even to the hands of leaders who are not more inclined to launch weapons than the US or Russian leaders. More threats were made during the Cold War, and there was a greater chance that one of those threats might have been carried out, than these analysts (like McGeorge Bundy) perceived or concede. (See McNamara now as opposed to his own views earlier).

[Vulnerable deployments; forward deployments; resistance to PALS; (threat of loss of control); alerts in crises; high-alert status; delegation; unauthorized action; false alarm prone warning systems; LOW; preemptive doctrine and training; FU threats; damage-limiting doctrine and readiness; decapitation (Andy Marshall, Derian says!)]

Of course, it is the case, fortunately, that none of the numerous U.S. first-use threats has been carried out. But a number of these appeared to the president at the time to have worked; at least, they were not defied. And in the case of one that clearly failed--Nixon's secret threat of escalation in the fall of 1969--it might well have been carried out in the absence of special coincidental circumstances: the "Moratorium," a massive public mobilization against the war.

Still, a number of these specialists believe that whatever might have been the case in the more distant past when the U.S. had overwhelming nuclear superiority, threats in the world of "nuclear plenty" and rough parity of the last twenty years have lacked all credibility. (It is striking that Nixon, Carter and Reagan have all continued to make such threats, and to back them with weapons developments and deployments at great expense, despite the onset of parity).

These analysts are, in effect, confident that for the indefinite future no American president would conceivably "push the nuclear button" to initiate either strategic or limited tactical nuclear warfare under any circumstances they can imagine, no matter what threats he might have made.

Much hangs on this judgment: especially on its absolute, or near-absolute tone. For if they are right to be so confident, then first-use threats, and the interventions or covert actions that may lead to them, and the developments in the arms race that support threats or escalation, are not, after all, so fraught with ultimate risk as I have been trying to convey.

U.S. interventions and the arms race may still be seen as too costly or not sufficiently rewarding--which is, in fact the main objection to them by the American public¹--but need not be seen or rejected as significantly dangerous.

The reasoning of these specialists and much of the public is simple and obvious, in regard to morality, prudence, and the nature of the American government. To initiate nuclear warfare, even on the most "limited" scale, would kill too many people, too many non-combatants. And even against a non-nuclear ally of the Soviet Union, let alone against Soviet forces, it would involve too great a risk of catastrophic retaliation. No president that the American people would elect could ever do it.

They take for granted, in effect: American officials don't massacre "innocents"; and they don't take risks of catastrophe. At least, they don't do such things knowingly and deliberately, with the kind of awareness and foresight that the prospect of initiating nuclear operations would force on them. And if they were tempted to do so, by the pressure of events or some personal lapse of judgment, their colleagues and advisors or subordinates would correct them.

Thus, they believe, the "human factor" will save us--at least until more weapons get into the hands of Third World dictators, less "responsible" than American or, for that matter, Soviet leaders.

Plausible. This view is widely accepted, by Americans, as common sense.² Indeed, a contrary judgment (which I hold) risks being seen as so unreasonably distrustful of American leadership as to be unpatriotic. There is no way to prove these analysts and other citizens are wrong; one desperately hopes they are not. But how much should we stake on their prediction? Is their confidence justified?

Both my experience and my research over more than 25 years tell me that it is not.

My research of the last nine months in particular has concentrated, in the words of my earlier research proposal, on "the moral and psychological universe of high-level national security managers, as this bears on the risks of nuclear war arising out of threats and commitments."

More precisely, it has focussed on the three specific aspects of "the human factor" raised above:

--The secret readiness of men in power to use massacre as an instrument of policy: readiness to slaughter noncombatants, or threaten it, whether by conventional bombing, nuclear weapons, or--in the case of U.S. policy, usually by encouraging and supporting

proxies--by death-squads or programs of genocide³;

--The secret readiness of men in power to gamble with catastrophe: readiness to undertake courses of action predicted by advisors to have a high and disproportionate risk of moral and political disaster, rather than to accept a limited, humiliating failure⁴;

--The secret readiness of subordinates to carry out policies they perceive as disastrous and perhaps immoral, in some cases long after any hope of justification has been overwhelmed by evidence of failure, risk and wrong-doing.⁵

My work under these categories remains to be written up in the next research period. Of my findings it is enough to say here that I find compelling evidence that many American officials over the last forty years, along with officials of other countries, have shown--to a dismaying degree, far more than most Americans imagine--the kinds of readiness described above.

I anticipate considerable intellectual and emotional resistance to such findings from Americans who have not looked at this evidence. Indeed, I can sympathize with fellow citizens who find painful--as well as problematic and offensive--the very thought of approaching data on American policymaking under such categories.

The information and experience I gained inside the government that led me to such explorations was painful for me too, even anguishing, and it still is. (The same is true for some of the most recent data, new to me, on U.S. covert encouragement of death-squad operations in Central and South America and genocide in Indonesia. I can still be shocked.)

If these conclusions betoken distrust of American men in power, I can say in the words of a recent television commercial that I came by that distrust "the old-fashioned way: I earned it" by working for such men, perhaps too long too trustingly. This story has yet to be told. It is the subject of a political memoir, which I propose to begin, even before reporting fully on my recent scholarly research.

To be sure, in 1988 it is no longer a new position for me to express public skepticism of high officials. It was seventeen years ago that I went on trial facing a possible 115 years in prison for releasing to the Senate and the press thousands of pages of top secret documents that were highly embarrassing to the historical record of five presidents, four of whom I had served as a high-level consultant or official.

Yet ten years before that, in 1961, I had been given the job of drafting, essentially to my own specifications, the Kennedy Administration's top secret guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

for their operational plans for general nuclear war. I was given that task in part because, from earlier work on the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear command and control process, I had learned more about nuclear war plans than any other civilian in the country.

Obviously, during that decade something had changed for me, above all in my attitude toward the office of the President, including my willingness to keep its secrets. Not in my loyalty to the country; that was not challenged even by my prosecutor, and a psychological profile prepared on me (secretly and illegally) by the CIA concluded correctly that I had acted "out of a higher sense of patriotism."

The very reason I had access to the sort of documents that I later revealed is that I had, and deserved, a reputation for extreme discretion and loyalty to my civilian bosses, tested qualities that had led to my being trusted with an extraordinary variety of closely-held secrets. Obviously, my loyalty reflected my own trust in their basic judgment, a confidence that we shared the same fundamental values and views of the national interest.

A commitment to keep their secrets and to help them carry out policies with which I might sometimes disagree was simply the price of sharing the secret data available to high-level officials in the national security apparatus and enjoying the chance to influence their views. Throughout most of the Sixties I had no real doubt that the bargain was well worthwhile.

Indeed, that confidence--shared by virtually all my colleagues--seemed unassailable to me. It seemed self-evident that furthering and influencing to the best of my talents the efforts of the president and his top national security advisors, whoever they might be, was the best way I could possibly serve my country.

But it was precisely what I came to learn in this dozen years working for these men that finally made me seek, and find, a better way. That required me, among other things, to disobey their orders to conceal various truths from the Congress, courts and public. I did that, though I expected to go to prison for the rest of my life for doing it.

Why? The Pentagon Papers speak for themselves; but they don't tell the full answer to that question. They were never all that I meant to reveal. Somewhat paradoxically, given what I have just said about my attitudes in the Sixties, some of my present concerns about national policy and the men who manage it were rooted in experiences I had very early in that decade. That was while I was still "deep in the belly of the whale" as a consultant and official, even before I worked on Vietnam.

Some of these experiences provided unsettling glimpses--esoteric even by the standards of a period when nearly everything I read was classified secret or top secret--of calculations that informed high-level decision-making. They revealed, in some of the men I was serving--despite their being conscientious, patriotic people--notions of what was permissible and what risks were worth taking that were startlingly different from values and constraints I had supposed we shared.

Perhaps I can best convey the import of the memoir that needs writing by describing briefly some of these incidents in the course of the Sixties--matters I have not set down before--that shaped my lasting preoccupations and eventually challenged my vocation of helping and advising men in power.

Here, then, are several fragments of a political memoir.

Three fragments; plus summary of "first strike planning"; (delegation?); plus recent info on risks of Cuba II, leading to comments on delegation (might Russians have done this? Ha, we did. And see Blair's Dead Hand). Plus mention of Nixon's bombing (and public lack of resistance to this; my own resistance, and the path to Watergate! My foreseeing that this lay ahead. The chance that it could have gone on much longer, indefinitely...)

I could ask for a grant to write a nuclear memoir, tout court. Why not? But for circulation, that should be published second, after attention and authority has been gained by my "main" memoir. But that puts it off significantly.

ideally, it should be in same memoir. But unless it is drafted before I get an advance, it is likely to be omitted or slighted, because of publisher pressure. (Is this true?) To include both will take longer to write, and will result in a longer book. (Will it, marginally at least, lower the audience, number of readers, because of content as well as length--less readable, attractive? A publisher would probably think so, prior to seeing it. But is that true?

I think not. It will make it a more interesting book, as well as a more important, influential and informative book.

It was my thought in the fall to write a nuclear memoir, first. But I didn't. Then I started writing, in the spring, on other subjects. Now that I know how to write, to get writing, I could do either.

I think that the best thing I can do now to help stop proliferation and to reduce the risk of nuclear war is to write a memoir of my personal experience inside the government and as a consultant dealing with the command and control of nuclear weapons, nuclear crises and with nuclear war planning. Few other personal accounts, and no abstract, academic or third-person study, could convey so vividly and convincingly the dangers of our nuclear era, and the dangers of trusting officials, in any country, like those I worked with to deal adequately with these problems or to tell the truth about them.

Ideally there would be a new policy of openness about these matters in all the nuclear weapons states like the glasnost under Gorbachev as he ended the Cold War, so that the publics and legislatures of these countries could grasp the urgency of the situation and begin to discuss and explore radically different policies. Ideally there would be candid testimony from others who had the kind of access I did accompanied by a vast release of documents. None of this shows signs of coming quickly if ever. But no one has a better chance to get it started than I do, with the story I can tell and my willingness to tell it.

Probably no other person combines my inside knowledge of nuclear war planning and decision-making, and the inner workings and impact of the secrecy system, with my readiness to expose these to the public. Those who know won't tell, because they would lose their clearances, and with them their jobs, careers, closest working relationships and their own current sense of status, identity and meaning. It is a price of candor that they can't even imagine paying, but one I have already paid.

I've considered writing a memoir confined to my nuclear experience, but I've had to conclude that that would have a relatively confined audience and impact at this time. What gives promise of reaching a much wider audience with this story is to combine it with the long-awaited and dramatic inside account of my later work on Vietnam leading to my release of the Pentagon Papers and its impact on Watergate, Nixon's departure and the ending of the war.

But this combination in an overall memoir will make for a longer book and a longer period of writing. Until much of the nuclear part of the story is available to be read, I suspect that publishers will find it hard to conceive that it could add enough in drama and import to the later account to make these costs worth financing. Therefore it seems advantageous to me to seek grant support from those who share my desire to unveil the dangers of the nuclear era for a wide audience for a period of writing during which I could get my personal knowledge of these matters down on paper. After that, I think I would have no trouble convincing a major publisher that this must be a significant part of the book, with the continuation of the work to be supported by an advance.

1. (p.4) See the data in my "Blind Man's Bluffs," attached.

2. (p. 5) As this copy was being proofread, the latest polling information on public attitudes was received (5 July, 1988), in National Survey No. 6, June, 1988, Americans Talk Security. Their note on this issue is as follows:

"Many national surveys have documented the American people's rejection of the First Use nuclear doctrine and this survey reinforces those other findings. The poll also reveals the people would be reluctant to use nuclear weapons, even under severe provocation.

"In 1984, in a landmark survey on nuclear arms policy conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation, Daniel Yankelovich wrote the following analysis about public misunderstanding of U.S. nuclear Doctrine.

'There are other areas of consensus where people's views are also held firmly and consistently, and some of them reveal serious misconceptions about what U.S. nuclear policy actually is. For example, by 69% to 22%, the majority deny that it is current policy of the United States to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets "if the Soviets invade Europe or Japan with soldiers and tanks... if they don't use nuclear weapons." Virtually all Americans (81%) mistakenly believe it is our policy to use nuclear weapons "if, and only if, the Soviets attack the United States first with nuclear weapons." This basic misconception about the purposes of the American nuclear arsenal represents a major disconnection between government policy and public understanding. It may explain much of the current confusion on nuclear issues.'

"Four years later, American rejection of the underlying principles behind the First Use doctrine seem intact: When asked under what circumstances the use of nuclear weapons might be justified, the people rejected their use except in the event an American city was destroyed by a limited nuclear attack.

"Using nuclear weapons to repeal a successful, but conventional, Soviet invasion of Europe was rejected by 11 to 1 margins.

"The Public Agenda Foundation conducted an exhaustive three-year study of American attitudes on U.S.-Soviet relations and the proper use of nuclear weapons was a frequent topic of the project's focus group research. John Doble, who helped coordinate the PAF project, found that, even when the First Use doctrine is carefully explained, Americans refuse to believe the U.S. government would ever implement the policy."

A chart headed "Proper Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" shows

that the proportion of the public in favor of using nuclear weapons in the event that "Soviets have successfully invaded Western Europe without using nuclear weapons" is 8%; 88% oppose. Even in the event of a "Limited nuclear attack waged on American military forces in combat," only 37% would favor a nuclear response; 57% would oppose.

The only case in which a bare majority--50% versus 44%--would favor a US nuclear response would be on the premise, "One American city is destroyed by limited nuclear attack." (Presumably, from earlier polling, this majority would be higher in the event of a massive attack on U.S. cities--though even here a sizeable minority would oppose a nuclear response).

Doble's finding corroborates what I have long guessed from my own smaller sample of discussions: that the public tends to regard U.S. nuclear first-use threats as pure bluff (hence, not ultimately dangerous to U.S. security), even when they are made aware of those threats (a rare condition) and when the threats are formal and explicit, as in U.S. commitments to NATO strategy for the "defense" of Western Europe. In this, they are simply assuming that "real, operational" US/NATO strategy is in accord with what they correctly see as common prudence. This assumption could not be more incorrect.

Moreover, the gap between public attitudes and those of "experts"/specialists is not only on the question of what U.S. official declaratory policy is; I am aware of a comparable gap as to what U.S. "action policy" (i.e., policy as to whether a threat should be carried out if defied) is and what it should be. Most experts not only understand but support current NATO policy, both in its declaratory and its action aspects. Thus, they know that the U.S. is very likely to carry out its threats to initiate at least tactical nuclear warfare in the event of a major Soviet non-nuclear incursion into Western Europe; and they also believe that it should do this. They would take the same position, if anything more strongly, on the premise of a Soviet nuclear attack on U.S. forces anywhere in the world.

I would agree with the public's position, not that of the majority of "experts," that the U.S. should not initiate nuclear warfare on any level under any circumstances whatever. But the public is flat wrong to imagine that under current practices of deployment and planning, U.S. forces would not do this under many circumstances. In this sense the "experts" are, unfortunately, right.

(Where I describe in the text above my disagreement with experts as to what U.S. forces would do with respect to carrying out a nuclear first-use threat, it has to do with a U.S. threat against a non-nuclear Third World opponent, not against a Soviet non-nuclear attack. Most "experts" are unaware that the U.S. has

frequently made the former type of threat at all, until I have presented the evidence for this.)

3. (p. 5) See bibliography, attached: "Moral and Psychological Universe of Decision-makers: Just War Theory; Ethics of Deterrence; Psychological and Bureaucratic Aspects of Genocide and Massacre; Strategic Bombing; Terrorism; Covert Action; Ethics and Gender." In terms of my reading over the last nine months, this particular bibliography is incomplete with respect to US covert involvement in Third World massacre.

In my work I use the word "terrorism" in a technical sense, meaning "the deliberate killing of non-combatants for a political purpose." I use the word massacre to mean the same, on a large scale. "Non-combatants" refers to unarmed civilians including civilian members of a political party or cadre, as well as the traditional categories of "innocents": women, children, old, and sick.

Americans like to believe, understandably, that neither word could be used objectively about deliberate U.S. government programs, or those of U.S. allies, whether covert or overt, wartime or peacetime.

However, the widespread, comfortable notion that American officials could not knowingly and deliberately countenance operations in wartime that slaughtered enormous numbers of non-combatants cannot survive a close look at the decision-making surrounding the targetting of civilians in the strategic bombing campaign against Japan in World War II, long before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Or at the earlier, comparable decision-making by our close ally Britain, with American approval, during its aptly-named campaign of "terror bombing" against Germany.

I began my own investigation of this history more than thirty years ago, and have over the last eighteen months brought my study up to date. I have long believed that knowledge of strategic bombing doctrines and practice in World War II and earlier was crucial to understanding many aspects of the nuclear era, including the moral/psychological issue raised here of the quasi-terrorist nature of nuclear planning with respect to the planned massacre of civilians.

In effect, I believe that in connection with their bombing programs from 1942 on, British and American top policymakers and their staffs secretly abandoned the central wartime constraint of Just War Doctrine, as embodied in religious ethics and international law: the absolute immunity of non-combatants from deliberate attack. What is in effect a secret new ethic of policymakers, in other states as well--erasing the distinction, for

purposes of targetting, between combatants and civilians--has had a profound effect, I believe, on planning for covert operations and for nuclear war as well, and on thus the security of civilians throughout the world.

4. (p. 5) See bibliographies attached, on The Cuban Missile Crisis and on Decision Theory. In connection with these, I might note my appreciation for the research assistance that grant funding has made possible over the last eighteen months. It has enabled me to pursue references on a scale I have not enjoyed since I left the Rand Corporation.

As my reading list on the Cuban Missile Crisis indicates, I have completed in the last nine months a comprehensive investigation of that crisis, in preparation for a major analytical case study. As I see it, potential lessons from this episode touch on nearly every aspect of the nuclear era.

In utilising major new data which has recently become available, I have the advantage of my earlier findings from a year-long, highly-classified study of nuclear crises that I undertook for the government in 1964. For a brief account of just a few of the new interpretations issuing from my recent work--on why the crisis ended as it did, and how close it came to war--see my New York Times OpEd piece (attached) and the related article by Seymour Hersh stemming largely from interviews with me (attached).

I have likewise analysed, as a case study in "gambling with catastrophe," President Johnson's decision to make an open-ended troop commitment to ground combat in Vietnam in 1965, drawing particularly on Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York and London, W.W. Norton, 1982), and on later work by Berman. Newly-released files from the White House--not known to me at the time or to the authors of the Pentagon Papers--show that this decision was made in the face of unusually emphatic and uncannily prescient warnings to the President from some of his most trusted advisors. These included statements that his course was "rash to the point of folly" and was not headed for "anything but catastrophe."

In other cases of disasters I have examined, from the Challenger explosion to Chernobyl, it is startling to discover how often the possibility of catastrophic failure was foreseen, often as a high probability, before the risky course of action was chosen over alternatives that were urged by some advisors as much safer.

I have found it very fruitful to examine this perplexing behavior--so relevant to the issue of possible risk-taking in a future nuclear crisis--in the light of hypotheses suggested by the experimental work of the psychologists Kahneman and Tversky on

gambling behavior and decision-making under uncertainty (see Decision Theory bibliography).

In particular, they have found in a wide variety of risk-taking contexts--though they have not so far applied their findings to political decision-making--that subjects will choose an option with a high and seemingly disproportionate risk of an extremely negative outcome--if it offers as well some chance of "coming out even, avoiding loss"--if the only alternative is a course that offers a certainly of loss, even if that sure loss is relatively small.

In political contexts, I find this a very powerful, explanatory hypothesis, in cases where the alternative of a "sure loss" represents a humiliating setback for the decision-maker personally, perhaps threatening him with the loss of a job or an election, even though the societal consequences may not otherwise seem great.

One finds decision-makers in hierarchical positions of power (usually male; I suspect there is a gender aspect in this) frequently acting as if this prospective personal loss of status or role were a "catastrophe" fully comparable, say, to a major inflation or the disastrous escalation of a war. They may take a high risk of the latter social catastrophe in the longer run, in order to avoid a short-run certainty of a "catastrophic" personal setback.

5. (p. 6) See bibliography on Obedience, attached. When I first read Stanley Milgram's Obedience to Authority in the early Seventies, I felt I understood, at last, the long complicity of many of my former colleagues in the Pentagon with a war in which they had ceased to believe, and earlier, in the construction of nuclear war plans in which no one could ever have believed. (See the two "fragments of a memoir," below, on my experience of these situations).

Milgram's experiments, the most famous in social psychology, revealed the startling willingness of most ordinary subjects, who had accepted a structure of authority, to obey rules that led them, apparently, to inflict extreme pain--in the form of electric shocks, up to potentially lethal levels--on innocent victims. Incentive and conditioning to act like "good Germans" is widely effective, Milgram demonstrated, on American citizens, though we are scarcely aware of it in those terms.

As the reading list in the bibliography indicates, I have found it useful to pursue widely the literature stemming from Milgram's work in the last twenty years. Some reinterpretation of his results seems possible to me, in ways that broaden their relevance and apply them to the perspective of leaders as well as

followers.

Specifically, one can infer, from some of his and others' data, compelling motives of commitment to agreements, and of conformity: both of which can explain destructive or risky leadership behavior as well.

All of this is directly relevant to the willingness of leaders to choose--and the willingness of subordinates to implement--courses that lead toward catastrophe or massacre: or both, as in Vietnam or on a path to nuclear war.